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Open peer commentary on John Banja’s "Could have chosen otherwise under identical conditions": An Evolutionary 
Perspective on Free Will. 
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1. John Banja offers an evolutionary account of free will according to which freedom is “a 
capacity to intend and execute behavior(s) that the organism understands to be in his or her 
best interests” (12). Thus, what it means to be free is not tantamount to the ability to act 
otherwise under identical conditions, as libertarian accounts of free will would have it. 
Rather, organisms, even though antecedently and completely determined by bioevolutionary 
processes (10), act freely insofar as they act in a way that confers to them an evolutionary 
advantage. To act freely, Banja holds, is to act smartly. And to act smartly is to act adaptively. 
 Banja offers his account as a superior alternative to the various extant libertarian 
formulations of free will. In one of the many places in which he criticizes such 
understandings of free will, he writes:  
 
The libertarian formulation of free will is not only oblivious to this dynamic and 
improvised drama between organism and world, it is also oblivious to the role of 
motivation in human willing and choosing, leaving us without a hint as to why an 
organism would want to choose differently under identical conditions. … [it also] 
entirely ignores the “human predicament” in which willing occurs – a predicament 
riddled with reasons, incentives, desires, anxieties, fears and interests that is far 
removed from the decontextualized atmosphere of metaphysical space (12). 
 
Banja is right: any adequate account of free will, insofar as it is intended to be an account of 
human freedom, ought to come to terms with what it means to be free as a human being. 
And evolutionary accounts of free will are sensitive to aspects of our human nature. They 
take seriously the relationship between organisms and the world; they understand organisms 
diachronically and in relationship to their welfare; and often, they shed light on why an 
organism has acted one way instead of another. Despite the aforesaid merits, it remains 
unclear whether Banja’s evolutionary alternative is sufficiently attuned to our human 
predicament. That is because a heavy reliance on evolutionary considerations runs the risk of 
eclipsing practical and social aspects of human life. Such aspects of human life are unlikely to 
be the products of evolutionary forces, and even if they are, evolutionary accounts are (prima 
facie) ill-equipped to bring to the fore the embodied, practical, and social dimensions of such 
aspects of human life. Without articulating in some detail how his account of free will 
accounts for choices that appear to be thoroughly and uniquely social or practical, Banja’s 
understanding of free will seems to share one of the shortcomings of typical libertarian 
accounts, namely, the inability grasp our human predicament and specifically the context in 
which our willings and actions occur. 
 
2. The fact that human existence is ineliminably embodied, practical, and social is a key and 
foundational insight of the phenomenological tradition (Heidegger 1962, Merleau-Ponty 
2002). A full discussion of its import and role within the phenomenological tradition is 
beyond the purposes of this commentary. It suffices to note that according to the 
phenomenological tradition (or at least, to certain important strands of this tradition), the 
manner in which situations and objects are disclosed to us depends both on our 
understanding of their practical, functional, and social significance and on the relationship 
that they bear to our bodies. In perceiving and navigating the world, not only do we 
encounter situations already invested with meaning and significance but we also always 
encounter them in terms of the various action possibilities that they afford us (Merleau-
Ponty 2002, 40-2, 245; 1967, 168). The space of actions, that is, the totality of possible 
actions that are available to an agent, is thoroughly social, embodied, and practical.  
 Consider the case of a trained gymnast. A balance beam affords different 
opportunities to the gymnast than to me. Indeed, the trained gymnast does not merely see 
the balance beam as an object that can support her weight or as a platform on which she can 
perform certain movements. She also perceives it as a means to success or to a potential 
career. She even sees it as an integral part of her life. I, on the contrary, simply fail to see the 
beam in all of those ways. The example of the gymnast is not unique, special, or in any way 
recherché. Our skills and sensitivities - be it bodily, social, or practical – transform our 
world. The world of someone who can read is rather unlike that of someone who cannot: 
once you acquire the capacity to read, books, road signs, newspaper articles, and evacuation 
instructions are perceived both as objects and as “calls” for various actions. Similar examples 
are easy to find: hackers perceive computers and networks as tools for exploitation, 
computer novices do not; kitchen tools and instruments are perceived primarily as means for 
cooking by a cook, but not by someone who has never even boiled water. 
 The above examples highlight the fact that our interactions with the world are 
already suffused with meaning and significance. More importantly, they also underline the 
manifest fact that the manner in which situations will be perceived affects the way in which 
we will act. Stated otherwise: the action possibilities that situations afford us are a function 
of how such situations are perceived by us. A hacker is both freer and more restrained to act 
than someone who knows very little about computer programming. Both have the freedom 
to turn on a computer, but only the former has the freedom to uncover security 
vulnerabilities – a freedom that depends upon conformity to certain rules (for more on this 
point see Dahlstrom 2007). Or consider someone who can read. Reading radically 
transforms many objects in her environment and her world is a world rich of possible 
actions. Books, for instance, are now readable and political leaflets or flyers are infuriating. 
At the same time however, her choices become, in an important sense, more restricted: she 
does not open emergency doors, she does not drive into one-way roads, and she minds the 
gap when stepping out of the subway. Such examples of human conduct call for an 
explanation.  
 
3. It seems clear that there is a type of freedom – one that is central to our human condition 
– that is premised on the existence and cultivation of certain abilities. Such abilities are 
neither clearly innate nor can they be easily explained as the products of evolutionary forces. 
But if that is the case, then in what way can an evolutionary account help us understand the 
freedom that results from such abilities? In other words, how could an evolutionary account 
explain the sense in which agents are free (or constrained) in various thoroughly social and 
practical situations? Recall that Banja understands freedom to be “a capacity to intend and 
execute behavior(s) that the organism understands to be in his or her best interests” (12). 
But the organism’s interests are not only biological interests. Banja thus owes us a story as to 
how his evolutionary understanding of freedom accounts for all the choices that are made 
available to us. As it stands, Banja’s account of freedom appears to be incomplete.  
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